Celebrities See All

Close

Quick Links

or

If there are only two people left in the Universe, and one of them is blind from birth, isn't the statement "The sky is blue" a Private Language? This seems like a really obvious example. Perhaps LW had some kind of system of rules which prohibits this example, but I am unaware of what they are. So, if Karl Marx called "offsides" in the Monty Python Philosophers' soccer game, it doesn't matter.

*

Remember that he was substituted in for Wittgenstein? Clearly meaningful, isn't it?

*

Back to the Philosopher's Soccer Match: I think Monty Python is implying that both Marx and Wittgenstein were basically wrong and are vainly trying to change all the rules of life. Also, I really liked the symbolism of the goal being scored with a "header" (use your head); also Latin for head is "caput", which makes a subliminal pun on "Capitalism".

*

The 'null-set', which contains nothing = { }. Yet it is still clearly a set, and clearly exists, at least in set theory. However, when Bertand Russell stated the paradox: "Consider the set of all sets which do not contain themselves... etc." is he not really pulling our legs?

*

LW says "Private Language does not exist".

*

That which does not exist is nothing. Therefore, if I think of Private Language, I think of nothing. If I think of nothing, then I do not think. However, clearly to think of nothing is still to think. Therefore, by Reductio ad absurdam (indirect proof), Private Language must exist.

*

Throw in a little Descartes up there: "Cogito ergo sum."

*

Sartre takes Hegel's thought that all statements imply their own negation to be justification that being must precede nothingness, and that nothingness cannot exist without being: http://books.google.com/books?id=X6RtpboH478C&lpg=PA14&ots=oxREobnGnR&dq=hegel+every+statement+implies+its+negation&pg=PA14#v=onepage&q=hegel%20every%20statement%20implies%20its%20negation&f=false

*

And if Sartre's comments are not a Private Language, I don't know what is (lol).

*

I've had several thousand emails in the last week asking me this question: "How can I visualize "transfunctors"?

In response to overwhelming popular demand, I submit the following illustrative M.C. Escher etching/print which exhibits the properties of "Co-Operators" refining and redefining their own (mutual existences)  http://thumbs.imagekind.com/museum/350X350/PYR/JPGS/GE26.jpg

Cobordant, cohomologous, homotopic and isotopic adjoint tensors mapping isomorphically on a 2-plane (projected/reduced from a 3-plane view) illustrate the fundamental nature of the 'Transfunctor', which is itself a purely conditional mapping from A to B, wherein B also maps to A both injectively and surjectively (i.e. 'bijectively')'. Is that clear and sufficient? Is anyone listening?? Ferris Bueller, are you listening?

*

 Define R as "Refutation of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument".

*

LW asserts: "There does not exist R." However, "There does not exist R" implies "There exists not R", which itself implies that R must exist, since how can "not R" be real if there is no "R"... Goes back to Hegel's thought that "Every statement implies its own negation," which is true in this case... At least, every statement implies the possibility of its negation.

*

~?R??~R?? R

*

If "Handwavium" is an element that can only be extracted from Wittgenstein, is it more similar to Unobtainium, a McGuffin, or the sound of one-hand clapping? Please choose and justify your argument with examples. Your essay should be at least 1000 words.

*

Two hands clap and there is a sound. What is the sound of one hand?  —Hakuin Ekaku

*

"...in the beginning a monk first thinks a k?an is an inert object upon which to focus attention; after a long period of consecutive repetition, one realizes that the k?an is also a dynamic activity, the very activity of seeking an answer to the k?an. The k?an is both the object being sought and the relentless seeking itself. In a k?an, the self sees the self not directly but under the guise of the k?an... When one realizes ("makes real") this identity, then two hands have become one. The practitioner becomes the k?an that he or she is trying to understand. That is the sound of one hand." — G. Victor Sogen Hori, Translating the Zen Phrase Book.

*

Wittgenstein himself used the example that even as ambiguous an unexplained word as "Slab" means a command to bring the speaker a slab. Logically, then, even if I do not explain what I mean by "R", if I say "R" it means "show me a private language"... If "R" cannot be produced, then "R" is a private language, since it cannot be understood or demonstrated...

*

"Slab" itself is a terse and rather oblique command which Wittgenstein uses as an example that even terse and oblique commands can be understood... in the sense of a surgeon saying "Scalpel", or "Clamp", or "Suture" during a surgery, indicating a request for a specific object, or action.

*

 Defining "R" as "that which refutes Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument", either R is understood or not understood. If R is not understood, then R must, by definition be a Private Language, the existence of which proves WPLArgument false. On the other hand, If R is understood (can be understood), R still refutes the WPLArgument, by necessity (since defined as "that which refutes WPLA). QED!

*

The crowd stands to its feet, applauds and cheers... utter pandemonium has broken loose...

*

I still like my idea that Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument is refuted by positing "R" (i.e. a refutation of the argument), since, if no one understands the refutation R, it itself is a "Private Language", proving its own existence. Simultaneously, if anyone at all can understand "R", then clearly R still refutes Wittgenstein's argument... Anyone want to argue about it? McGuffin or not?

*

If no one can understand the refutation of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, then that proves that a Private Language exists. Also, if someone can understand the refutation of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, then that also proves the refutation. Case closed, eh??????????????lol rotflmao

*

Learning to recycle: Modern linguists now believe that there is no known Isogloss for 'Meylerspeak', such that each element of set 'M' has a bijective (i.e. both injective and surjective) linear mapping onto set I (Isogloss) demonstrating isomorphism between definiendum and definiens. Hence, Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" appears to have been refuted... turning over a new leaf for Modern Philosophy!

*

possibly the funniest thing I have ever written, and likely to be the truest...... because "Isogloss" actually means "Heterogloss" (linguistic border or boundary between different dialects of the same language)... so part of the joke is that linguists are so stupid that they use antonyms to mean the same thing, but the other part is that this is a paradox about Wittgenstein's Private Language argument which states that "no private language exists", except that if everyone essentially speaks a translatable language (relative to each other) then the fact that no one can understand the refutation actually proves that a private language does, essentially exist.... Humor!!

*

?"a joke's not funny, if you have to explain it"... LOL!!! rotflmao!!!

*

I don't agree with Stephen that he can make a 'scientific' evaluation of the possibility of either the existence of God or an afterlife which is anything other than an opinion, though. On the other hand, I do very much like the existential implications of Stephen's remarks.

*

"I'm so vain, you bet I think most songs are about me"

*

If ? K: P(K) = K(P) is defined as the function of understanding "Private Language Argument", and ~K(P) is defined as not understanding "Private Language Argument"; then the refutation of the private language argument should be expressed as "If ? K: P(K) = K(P) is false, then ~K(P) must be universally true; which implies that no one can understand P [i.e. there does not exist S (i.e. someone)] who understands K(P).

In this example, the functor "K" is used to symbolize 'understanding' or, perhaps more appropriately, 'knowledge of a specific fact'. "P" is both the subject  and the object of the function (discussed above), which means: "Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument is true".

*

In this specific example, I have created the idea of the "transfunctor", which is simultaneously subject and object of the function.

*

... not to be confused with 'contravariant' and 'opposite' functors, or 'cofunctors', or 'bifunctors' or 'multifunctors'... or 'covariant' functors... NOPE! "Transfunctors" are a totally new invention (in my private language) which no one else has yet defined or understood. Can someone explain to me what the Hell a 'transfunctor' would be?????????????

*

Please not to confuse "Transfunctors" with "T-annihilators": Definition. Let T be a linear operator on a finite dimensional vector space V over F, and let v ? V be a nonzero vector. The polynomial p(t) ? F[t] is called a T-annihilator of v if p(t) is a monic polynomial of least degree among the polynomials for which p(T)(v) = 0

*

Slightly proud of myself today, since I invented a 'transfunctorial' proof that Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" is false. Using my new concept of 'transfunctors' (which are not previously well-defined in Mathematics and Algebra), I annihilated the Wittgensteinian argument. How appropriate, since Latin "transfunctorius" is defined as: From an 1888 Latin-English Dictionary, which Wittgenstein probably never read: transfonctorlus, adj. [implies a sb. transfunctor from transfungor] done with a view to getting utterly rid of the work, perfunctory, careless, praecepta, Tert. Marc. 1, 27; expugnatio, id. Valent. 6. -- written by "Thomas Hewitt Key"

*

"If a tree falls in the forest, and no one else is around, is it speaking a private language?" > ("Die Spruce die allein ich verstehe" --LW; mistranslated correctly ="The tree which I alone stand under").

  •  
    • I thought I'd 'branch' out here, somewhat, and remind the reader of Wittgenstein's fascination with "The Golden Bough". What if Wittgenstein's entire "Private Language Argument" was really a 'private joke' he alone understood... along the lines of Michel de Montaigne's essay "To Philosophize is to Learn to Die" -- In which case, I think being a "slow student" could be advantageous, at least to one's health.


    •  ?"A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes" -- Ludwig Wittgenstein.

    If I'm telling myself a joke, but I don't tell myself the punchline, how will I know I'm joking? I think it's important to note that Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote pretty much all of his works "with a straight face"... deadpan humor, clearly.

Methinks Kripke says Quine (Quot!, Quintilian Quaalude) is skeptic of the skeptic argument of Wittgenstein (vs. "Private Language"): "'x quus y' = x + y, if x, y

  • Linguists now believe that there is no known isogloss for 'Meylerspeak', such that each element of set 'M' has a bijective (injective and surjective) linear mapping onto set I (isogloss) demonstrating isomorphism between definiendum and definiens. Hence, Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" appears to have been refuted... turning over a new leaf for Modern Philosophy! (lol)
    • Nicholas Meyler ?"What is 'I'?" = Isogloss; the imaginary peripheral membrane separating divergent linguistic realities; akin to GBS' remark: "Two countries separated by a common language."

    • ?"There is no private language."

    • "Yes, there is."

    • "No, there isn't."

    • "Yes, there is."

    • "No, there's not."

    • "Is"

    • "Isn't"

    • "Yes there is, and this isn't even an argument."

    • "Yes it is."

    • "Isn't."

Advertisement
Advertisement

From Around the Web

More